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A GAP IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: RETHINKING THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S APPROACH TO CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS

Samantha T. Baccaro*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual or entity charged with criminal or civil
violations for corporate wrongdoing or fraud against the
government may attempt to use their effective compliance
program as evidence to reduce liability. 1 Some scholars and
practitioners have suggested that an effective compliance
program can essentially be a defense to criminal charges, but
there is no comparable defense in civil cases. 2 This dichotomy
leaves a significant recognition gap in the health care industry.
The reason for this gap is because the majority of the settlements
and judgments recovered by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
relate to matters in the health care industry brought under the
False Claims Act (“FCA”), and most individuals bring these
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1 U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., Guidance on the Use of the Civil False Claims Act in
Civil
Health
Care
Matters
(updated
Mar.
3,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memo-guidance-use-false-claims-act-civilhealth-care-matters-june-3-1998; Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections
on the Government’s Stick and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51
ALA. L. REV. 319, 348 (1999).
2 Marc S. Raspanti & Gregg W. Mackuse, What’s Really So Important About an
Effective Compliance Program?, THE CHAMPION, May 2007, at 22 (“The
conventional belief in some compliance and in most law enforcement and
prosecutorial circles is that an effective compliance program may insulate a
corporation from criminal charges.”).
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claims civilly. 3, 4 The FCA is a series of federally enacted statutes
to address fraud against the government. 5 A person or entity
violates the FCA when they falsely obtain “money from the
government or [are] improperly relieved from paying money to
the government.” 6
Advocating for a compliance program defense in criminal
investigations creates an inconsistency in the law for civil
investigations. The current framework does not further the
DOJ’s goal, particularly in the health care industry, of deterring
and preventing fraud before it occurs. 7 The current framework
also does not enable the DOJ to use the FCA to its full potential
as their primary weapon for fighting fraud against the
government. 8 Part II of this Comment sets out the history of the
FCA, an overview of corporate responsibility, how companies
have relied on their corporate compliance programs in reducing
criminal charges, and how the DOJ currently approaches civil
claims under the FCA. Part III discusses how the differences in

3

Fiscal

Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Year
2019,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(Jan.
9,
2020),

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 (stating that more than $3 billion in settlements
and judgments was obtained by the government from fraud and false claims against
them and, of that amount, $2.6 billion involved matters relating to the health care
industry).
4 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Carrots and Sticks: Placing Rewards
as Well as Punishment in Regulatory and Tort Law, 51 HARV. J. LEGIS. 315, 338
(2014).
5
Jim Moye, Are We Bulletproof?: A Defensive Business Strategy to Protect

Health Care Companies from False Claims Act Litigation and Corporate Integrity
Agreements, 41 U. BALT. L. F. 24, 28 (2010); see Katheryn Ehler-Lejcher, The
Expansion of Corporate Compliance: Guidance for Health Care Entities, 25 WM.

MITCHELL L. REV. 1339, 1372 (1999) (noting that the FCA was first enacted in 1863
to aid the defense industry in fighting fraud but was later revived to address all
industries).
6 31 U.S.C. § 3729; Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 328.
7

Fiscal

Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(January
2020),
Year
2019,

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 (stating that “the significant number of settlements
and judgments obtained over the past year demonstrate the high priority this
administration places on deterring fraud against the government”).
8
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266;
see Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 327.
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criminal and civil charges impact the health care field as the
industry with the largest number of claims brought under the
FCA. Part IV provides a solution by suggesting effective
compliance programs as an affirmative defense to civil charges.
Part IV also discusses what factors would constitute an effective
compliance program. Finally, Part IV addresses the opposition
to this new framework.
This comment will argue that the issue in supporting
compliance programs as a defense to corporate criminal charges
is that it leaves out the widely brought claims from the health
care industry under the civil FCA. This paper concludes that
individuals should support an argument for an affirmative
compliance defense for civil cases, like criminal cases. The DOJ
should use its discretionary authority to initiate a new policy that
allows companies facing civil liability under the FCA to present
evidence of its effective compliance program as an absolute
defense to the fines and penalties.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. History of the False Claims Act
Congress first signed the FCA into law in 1863 to address
fraud against the government during the Civil War. 9 The law was
largely unused until its revival in 1986 when Congress
strengthened the statute due to escalating fraud against the
government. 10 Congress first enacted the broadly written FCA to
be used for fraud against the military, but it eventually became
the government’s primary tool to fight fraud against all federally
funded programs. 11 In response to increased Medicare and
Medicaid fraud, the DOJ began using the FCA to combat health
care fraud. 12 The FCA prohibits frauds including, but not limited
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269.
The law was passed in response to contractor fraud against the Union Army during
the Civil War.
10 Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 328.
11
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273;
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 327.
12
See Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
the government directly or indirectly pays for claims of Medicare and Medicaid,
thus triggering liability under the FCA for false claims to those programs); Morris
9
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to: (1) knowingly submitting, or causing to be submitted, to the
federal government a false or fraudulent claim for payment; (2)
knowingly using, or causing to be used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid by the
government; (3) conspiring with others to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid by the government; and (4) knowingly
using, or causing to be used, a false record or statement to
conceal, avoid or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the government (“reverse false claim”). 13
Under the FCA, both the DOJ and private individuals may
bring an action on behalf of the federal government. 14
Individuals, usually employees of a company, may bring qui tam
suits under the FCA, which allow private parties, or “relators” to
allege FCA violations on behalf of the government and share in
any recovery.15 When a party files a qui tam complaint, the DOJ
launches an investigation into the alleged acts and decides
whether to intervene. 16 If the DOJ decides to intervene, it
becomes the primary prosecutor on the case, while the relator
remains a party. 17 The FCA imposes heightened penalties per
violation, treble damages, and debarment as methods to deter
illegal conduct. 18 The relator also receives an award for bringing
the fraudulent acts to the DOJ’s attention and may receive up to
25% of the award if the government intervenes and up to 30% if
the government does not intervene.19 One of the main goals of
the 1986 amendments was to enhance the qui tam provision of
the law because Congress believed there should be a
“coordinated effort” between the government and the relator to
oppose those defrauding federal funds. 20
Relators started
& Thompson, supra note 1, at 327.
13 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(7).
14
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)–(b); Fixing the False Claims Act: The Case for
Compliance-Focused Reforms, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 6 (2013),
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/fixing-the-false-claims-act-the-case-forcompliance-focused-reforms/ [hereinafter Compliance-Focused Reforms].
15 Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 329.
16 Compliance-Focused Reforms, supra note 14.
17 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c); see Compliance-Focused Reforms, supra note 14.
18 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 337–38; see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
19 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2); see Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 345.
20 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5266–67.
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responding to Congress’ action, and the number of qui tam suits
increased each year. 21 Notably, anti-fraud efforts in the health
care industry became law enforcement’s primary focus, with
public policymakers and private citizens increasingly seeking to
join these efforts.22 By 1996, most parties bringing qui tam suits
were bringing claims against health care providers, and these
kinds of claims continue to be the majority today. 23
B. Corporate Responsibility
Traditionally, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
corporations can be held vicariously liable for employee
misconduct. 24 Illegal actions by the agents of a corporation,
within the scope of their employment, may be imputed to the
corporation either criminally or civilly. 25 Even in situations where
the employee’s actions were explicitly forbidden by the
corporation or were contrary to corporate policy, the corporation
can still be held liable. 26 Thus, under the current law, a
corporation with an effective compliance program can do
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 329.
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 329–30.
23 Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 330.
24 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
25 N.Y.C. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1909) (holding
that tort doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds a corporation liable for
actions of its agent within scope of employment, can render corporation criminally
liable); Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109 (1893) (holding that
for acts done by agents of corporation, in course of employment, corporation is
responsible to same extent an individual is responsible under similar
circumstances).
26 Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252,
1259 (1996); see e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d
656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that no matter how extensive a corporation’s
compliance program is, corporation is not immune from liability when an employee
fails to comply with the law); United States v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 770
F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a corporation would still be held liable
even when employee’s actions were “contrary to corporate policy”); United States v.
Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that corporation may
still be held liable for employee’s illegal acts, even if such acts were “against
corporate policy or express instructions”). The Restatement notes that even an
employee’s unauthorized conduct is still within the scope of employment.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 230 (Am. Law Inst. 1958) (“An act, although
forbidden[] . . . may be within the scope of employment.”).
21
22
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everything right but is still not immune from liability for an
employee’s wrongful actions. 27
This system provides little
incentive for corporations to effectively regulate their employees’
conduct and fails to reward compliance programs. 28
C. The DOJ’s Approach to Criminal Charges
For criminal prosecutions of noncompliance, there is a
clearly defined and detailed framework surrounding rewards for
compliance programs, cooperation credit for self-disclosure, and
actual calculations for how compliance will affect criminal fines.
An organization may have its criminal penalties reduced after a
conviction, or the prosecutor may choose not to proceed due to
an effective compliance program.29 An effective compliance
program generally might include “an internal audit of the
current processes; a determination of what current practices may
be illegal or potentially abusive; a written code of conduct for
management and staff; a training program for employees; and a
periodic audit to ensure that the adopted standards are being
followed.” 30 In some law enforcement and prosecutorial settings,
it is believed that effective compliance programs should shield a
corporation from criminal charges. 31 Under this view, denying
corporate charges to companies who have a convincing
compliance structure rewards the company and allows
prosecutorial resources to focus on those that have ignored the
compliance scheme. 32 A strong compliance program can reduce
a company’s liability because it can show the company had a
system in place to comply with the law and that it did not have
the requisite intent needed for the government to prove the

Huff, supra note 26, at 1254.
Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a
Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
605, 678 (1995); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate
Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78
GEO. L. J. 1559, 1645 (1990).
29
David Favre, Alexander Bodaken et al., Health Care Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM.
REV. 895, 943 (2020).
27
28

30
31
32

Id.

Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2.
Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention § 14.01.
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illegal act. 33
When determining whether to bring criminal charges against
a corporation, prosecutors use the “Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations” in their investigations. 34
These principles make clear that the DOJ considers compliance
significantly in deciding whether to bring charges and
negotiating agreements with corporations.35 The Justice Manual
(“JM”) lists eleven factors to be considered, but two directly
reward behaviors related to compliance programs. “[T]he
adequacy and effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance
program at the time of the offense . . . and the corporation’s
remedial actions, including . . . any efforts to implement an
adequate and effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one.” 36
Further, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(hereinafter “Sentencing Guidelines”) acknowledge compliance
programs in reducing a corporation’s sentence and provide a
specific framework in calculating their fine based on a
“culpability score.” 37 The Sentencing Guidelines provide how the
court determines the fine by calculating the “base fine” and
adjusting it based on the culpability score. 38 The Sentencing
Guidelines explicitly grant the court the power to reduce a
criminal fine based upon finding an existing compliance
program.39 One of the factors specifically expressed is whether
the crime occurred “despite an effective program to prevent and
detect violations.” 40 A company’s culpability score is reduced by
three points if the offense occurred regardless of an effective
compliance program in place. 41
33
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 348; but see supra Part II on
Corporate Responsibility.
34
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.300 (July 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-businessorganizations [hereinafter Corporate Prosecution Principles].
35
Id.; see Jacob T. Elberg, A Path to Data-Driven Health Care Enforcement,
20 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2020).
36 Corporate Prosecution Principles, supra note 34.
37 U.S.S.G § 8C2.5; Huff, supra note 26, at 1267–68.
38 U.S.S.G § 8C2.5.
39 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f).
40
41

Id.
Id.; Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in
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In an April 2019 guidance document, updated in June 2020,
the DOJ’s Criminal Division issued a robust framework on what
companies should address in their compliance programs and the
elements necessary to reduce a criminal sentence. 42 A company
that is convicted of criminal wrongdoing but meets the
requirements for an effective compliance program under the
Sentencing Guidelines can receive as much as a 95% reduction of
its “base fine.” 43 Going beyond reducing the amount of the fines,
arguing for a compliance program as a potential defense to
criminal charges would allow the DOJ and companies with
efficient compliance programs to partner together to combat
fraud and corruption. 44
Beyond the Corporate Prosecution Principles and
Sentencing Guidelines, the DOJ has also established additional
incentives for compliant behaviors and has continuously
increased its guidance and transparency to rewarding compliant
behaviors.45 While focused on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”), the DOJ has made formal incentives for cooperation,
self-disclosure, and remedial investments in compliance
programs through the FCPA Resource Guide in 2012 and
formalizing the FCPA Pilot Program into the Corporate
Enforcement Policy in the JM in 2018.46 The Corporate
Enforcement Policy is binding in FCPA cases and is “aimed at
Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the
Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 375, 378–79 (1993).
42
Dep’t. of Just. Crim. Div., Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs,

U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(June
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/page/file/937501/download.
43
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations at Twenty Years, 22
ETHICS RESOURCE CTR. (2012), https://www.theagc.org/docs/f12.10.pdf; Marcia
Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative Defense to
Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 68 (2012); see generally
U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.4–2.7.
44 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 319.
45 Elberg, supra note 35, at 1177.
46
See Elberg, supra note 35, at 1177; U.S. Dep’t of Just. & U.S. SEC, A
Resource Guide To The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download;
Rod
Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at 34th International
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017) in JUST. NEWS,
Nov.
29,
2017,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-generalrosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign.
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providing additional benefits to companies based on their
corporate behavior once they learn of misconduct.” 47 Essentially,
a company may have done nothing to stop the misconduct, but
can still reduce its penalties by cooperating after the wrongdoing
occurs. 48 This allows the DOJ to agree to or recommend to a
sentencing court a 50% reduction off the low end of the
Sentencing Guidelines fines. 49 Additionally, in 2018, the DOJ
announced the Corporate Enforcement Policy could be used as
“nonbinding guidance” in other corporate criminal areas outside
the FCPA. 50 While it is important to provide these types of
incentives to companies for their compliant behaviors, it is also
important to recognize that the DOJ has the power to further
deter any wrongdoing by detecting the misconduct before it
reaches the level of prosecution, in criminal and civil cases. This
can be accomplished with a compliance program defense which
will incentivize companies to invest in their compliance programs
and allow criminal and civil cases to be treated consistently.
Additionally, in two instances, the United States Courts of
Appeals have concluded that a jury may consider a compliance
program to decide whether they are liable for criminal actions of
their employees. 51 These cases provide the basis for an argument
in favor of a compliance defense. In United States v. Basic
Constr. Co., 52 the defendants were charged with conspiring to rig
the bidding for state road paving contracts, and the jury received
instructions that “[a] corporation may be responsible for the
action of its agents . . . even though the conduct . . . may be
contrary to the corporation’s actual instructions . . . . [but], the
existence of such instructions and policies . . . may be considered
47
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 9-47.120(1) (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977#947.120.
48
49

Id.
Id.

50 John P. Cronan, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at Practising
Law Institute Event (Nov. 28, 2018), in JUST. NEWS, Nov. 28, 2018,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-generaljohn-p-cronan-delivers-remarks-practising-law.
51
Huff, supra note 26, at 1253; See United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711
F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir.
1979).
52 United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983).
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by you in determining [liability].” 53 In United States v. Beusch, 54
the corporation was convicted for an employee’s failure to report
receipt of currency in an amount exceeding $5,000 from outside
the United States, and the court held that vicarious liability may
hold a corporation liable for acts of its employees done against
the express instructions and policies, but that the “existence of []
instructions and policies may be considered in determining
whether the [corporation is liable for the actions of an
employee].” 55 Notably, the court also held that because a
compliance program may be weighed in determining a
corporation’s liability, the corporation is not subject to strict
liability. 56
In other sectors, such as securities law, federal regulatory
laws recognize compliance programs as a defense to regulatory
offenses and as an affirmative requirement. 57 The securities law,
under which controlling persons may be held liable for their
employees’ illegal actions, provides a “good faith defense” which
encompasses compliance programs. 58 The law establishes that an
employer, who exercised due care in supervising its employees
and can show that they diligently enforced an adequate internal
supervision system at the time of the misconduct, can invoke the
defense.59
The Model Penal Code also establishes a “due diligence”
defense to criminal charges for a corporation’s regulatory

53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Beusch, 596 F.2d at 873, 878.
Id.
Id. at 878; see Huff, supra note 26, at 1266.
Huff, supra note 26, at 1270–71.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause
of action.;
Huff, supra note 26 at 1271.
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994); Huff, supra note 26, at 1271.
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offenses.60 The corporation needs to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that a high-level manager attempted due
diligence to prevent the crime. 61 This defense would show that
the company did not have the requisite mens rea to commit the
offense. 62 Scholars argue that this approach furthers the goal of
deterrence by “encouraging corporations to engage in selfpolicing.” 63 In many cases where a corporation is able to escape
criminal sanctions, they still must pay significant fines under civil
liability. 64
The defenses mentioned above are only available to a
corporation facing criminal charges. But there is no guidance or
transparency from the DOJ in how they calculate resolutions for
civil false claims.65
D. The DOJ’s Approach to Civil Charges
The DOJ’s substantial guidance on rewarding compliant
behavior in criminal matters, including a robust framework and
incentive structure, has led to advocacy for a compliance defense
in criminal matters. But there has not been the same kind of
discussion among the DOJ or scholars for a compliance defense
for civil penalties. This substantially impacts the health care
companies facing charges because they are likely to be held civilly
liable and are not given the same rewards to reduce their liability
as under the criminal structure. 66 In stark contrast to the detailed
Corporate Prosecution Principle discussed above, until 2015 it
was not clear whether the DOJ even had a policy of rewarding
corporations for their compliant behaviors in civil cases. 67 The
Model Penal Code § 2.07(5) (1985); Huff, supra note 26, at 1273.
Model Penal Code § 2.07(5) (1985); Huff, supra note 26, at 1273.
62 Huff, supra note 26, at 1274.
63 Huff, supra note 26, at 1274.
64
Sara Sun Beale, The Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of
Corporate Criminal Liability and the Yates Memo, 46 STETSON L. REV. 41, 56
(2016).
65 Elberg, supra note 35, at 1187.
66
Jacob Elberg, Neither Carrots nor Sticks: DOJ’s Unfulfilled Commitment to
Corporate Health Care Compliance, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (noting that
criminal prosecution is not the DOJ’s “weapon of choice” in fighting health care
fraud and the criminal guidance is inapplicable to the civil FCA).
67 Elberg, supra note 35, at 1187.
60
61
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issuance of a memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Sally
Quillian Yates (“Yates Memo”) addressed the DOJ’s efforts to
increase accountability for corporate wrongdoing and provided
that civil prosecutors had to take a corporation’s cooperation into
account. 68 Yet, following the Yates Memo, scholars recognized
that the announcement did not offer any real guidance as to how
cooperation should be used in reducing penalties.69
In May 2019, the DOJ issued a Guidance Memo and
Updates to the JM, which merely discussed taking a company’s
remedial measures into account to reduce damages and civil
penalties. 70 This guidance focuses on corrective actions after the
fact and does not specifically offer rewards for pre-existing
programs. 71 It also gave little detail on the specific measures
necessary to reduce penalties. The DOJ has the discretion to and
will often decline criminal prosecution under the FCA, thus
leaving even more charges to be brought civilly. 72 Under the
prosecutor’s control, corporations do not face criminal charges
68
Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to Assistant Att’ys
Gen.,
Dirs.,
&
U.S.
Att’ys
(Sept.
9,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download
[hereinafter
Yates
Memo].
69
Elberg, supra note 35, at 1187; see Gejaa Gobena, Mitch Lazris, Peter S.
Spivack & Karla Aghedo, DOJ Embraces a More Realistic Position on Corporate
Cooperation, 33 No. 05 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 2, WL 124214
(2019) (“[T]he impact of cooperation on the calculation of civil FCA settlement
amounts remains a mystery.”); Laura McLane & Rebecca C. Martin, Cooperation in

the Eye of the Beholder: DOJ Official Bill Baer Elaborates on Cooperation in False
Claims Act and Other Civil Enforcement Matters, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY

(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.mwe.com/insights/doj-elaborates-on-cooperation-in-fca/
(“[D]efendants continue to be in the dark about what benefits cooperation
genuinely confers.”).
70 See Department of Justice Issues Guidance on False Claims Act Matters and
Updates
Justice
Manual,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(May
2019),

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-actmatters-and-updates-justice-manual; see also U.S. Dep’t. of Just., § 4-4.112
Guidelines for Taking Disclosure, Cooperation, and Remediation into Account in
False Claims Act Matters (May 2019), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-4-4000commercial-litigation#4-4.112 [hereinafter Guidelines for Cooperation and
Remediation in FCA Matters].
71 Guidelines for Cooperation and Remediation in FCA Matters, supra note 70.
72 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1095, 1167 (2006).
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often because the prosecutor may rely on the substantial
penalties offered under the civil FCA. 73 These penalties include
up to three times the amount of damages the government
sustains due to any wrongdoing and currently range from about
$11,000 to about $23,000 per violation. 74 Notably, penalties are
given for each separate violation of the law and, in some cases,
can include a multitude of violations, reaching into the millions
of dollars for penalties. 75
In contrast to the DOJ’s Criminal Division guidance
regarding reducing penalties for a pre-existing compliance
program, the Civil Division guidance does not explicitly state
such a program will reduce its penalties. 76 The Civil Division
simply states that it will “take into account the prior existence of
a compliance program in evaluating a defendant’s liability” and
that the DOJ “may consider the nature and effectiveness” of the
program.77
As discussed in further detail below, there is
insufficient evidence that the DOJ rewards compliant behaviors. 78
Professor Jacob Elberg has analyzed the difference in the DOJ’s
approaches for rewarding compliance programs in criminal and
civil cases, and examined hundreds of recent health care FCA
resolutions, finding that the DOJ does not appear to provide
benefits for pre-existing compliance programs.79
The DOJ must go further than a mere consideration of
disclosure, cooperation, and remediation because its goal under
civil FCA claims to incentivize companies, without giving value to

73 Wray & Hur, supra note 72; see Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 378 (stating
that prosecutors often decide that criminal pursuit of the corporation under the
FCA would not further public interest).
74 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 85 Fed.
Reg. 37004 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 85) (adjusting the FCA
penalties for 2020 inflation); David W.S. Lieberman, 2020 False Claims Act
WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW
COLLABORATIVE
(July 1,
2020),
Penalties,
https://www.whistleblowerllc.com/2020-false-claims-act-penalties/.
75 Lieberman, supra note 74.
76 Guidelines for Cooperation and Remediation in FCA Matters, supra note 70;
see Beale, supra note 64.
77 Guidelines for Cooperation and Remediation in FCA Matters, supra note 70.
78 Elberg, supra note 35, at 1172.
79 Elberg, supra note 66 (emphasizing the DOJ may be rewarding pre-existing
compliance programs, but with no transparency for the public to see those
impacts).
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its programs and encouraging compliance, will not be strongly
accepted without further reward. 80
While the DOJ works
diligently to prosecute those who commit fraud against the
government, litigation only reaches a portion of the illegal acts. 81
As the acting United States Assistant Attorney General, Stuart
Delery, noted, “[l]itigation to recover the costs of fraud is a far
inferior option to preventing fraud in the first place.” 82 Thus, the
government should initiate a consistent standard to aid
companies in creating an effective compliance program to
counter fraud and preserve the Department’s scarce resources.
As mentioned above, this was the main goal of the 1986
amendments to combat the “‘pervasive’ fraud against the
government.” 83
At the time, Congress believed “only a
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will
decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.” 84
The
government and companies could work together under an
incentive system to encourage the expansion of compliance
programs if the government also allows pre-existing compliance
programs to mitigate civil penalties.85
III.

ANALYSIS

The FCA relies primarily on private relators to bring lawsuits
on behalf of the government alleging a corporation committed
fraud. 86 As discussed below, this is commonplace for the health
care industry, but the DOJ must increase its transparency and
advance its reward structure for FCA matters. 87 The DOJ has the
Guidelines for Cooperation and Remediation in FCA Matters, supra note 70;
Elberg, supra note 66 (noting that the DOJ’s failure to publicly reward pre-existing
compliance programs undermines their enforcement goals).
81
Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the American Bar
Association’s Ninth National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam
Enforcement (June 7, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistantattorney-general-stuart-f-delery-speaks-american-bar-association-s-ninth.
80

82
83
84

5267.

Id.

Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 329, 329.
See S. REP. No. 99-345 at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,

Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 319.
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 329.
87
Elberg, supra note 35, at 1214. A data analysis study of more than 115
corporate health care FCA settlements between February 2018 and June 2019
85
86
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chance to improve its relationship with the health care industry
and further encourage compliant behaviors, “far beyond what
can be achieved through individual enforcement actions.” 88
Thus, health care companies involved in civil FCA disputes
should at least be able to evoke the same protections afforded to
them in a criminal prosecution to reduce civil fines. But in these
scenarios, a concrete and effective compliance program is the
company’s best protection against the government’s obligation to
prevent fraud and can allow the company to internally avoid
fraud and abuse before they occur.
Compliance programs have become an essential tool in
protecting the government from being defrauded by discovering
and preventing fraud before it begins. 89 A new approach to the
current incentives is necessary because while qui tam suits have
allowed for uncovering of substantial frauds, there is a chance
that those individuals can exploit the provision for their own
financial benefit. 90 There is also a competitive aspect to filing a
qui tam suit because only the first individual to file can be the
relator in the case. 91 Unfortunately, this has led to wasteful
lawsuits under the FCA. 92 A change to incentives is needed to
allow for the government to recover the heightened penalties to
punish companies who commit fraudulent acts, while also
avoiding any speculative lawsuits or minor violations that can be
resolved before litigation. 93
In shareholder derivative actions, an effective compliance
program has provided companies a defense against the directors’
revealed a complete “absence of evidence that DOJ rewards compliant behaviors.”
Elberg, supra note 35, at 1172. The study also showed that the DOJ was not more
forgiving in cases where defendants cooperated or self-disclosed than when
defendants did cooperate or self-disclose. Elberg, supra note 35, at 1170. This data
raises questions about the DOJ’s consistency and the conduct the DOJ actually
considers in reducing penalties. The author of the study, Professor Jacob Elberg,
argued that a more uniform approach is needed for the DOJ to value compliance
programs appropriately to deter fraud before it occurs. Elberg, supra note 35,
at 1205.
88 Elberg, supra note 35, at 1214.
89 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4.
90 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4.
91 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4.
92 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4.
93 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 339.
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personal liability. 94 An adequate compliance program has been
shown to meet the duty of care necessary for corporate directors
to stay informed of the operations of the company. 95 In In re
Caremark Int’l, the shareholders attempted to hold directors
personally liable for breach of their duty of care by failing to
adequately oversee employees’ conduct and costing the company
large civil and criminal penalties when employees entered into
financial agreements with referring doctors.96 The Court of
Chancery of Delaware held that only a total failure to exercise
reasonable oversight would render a director liable and that
Caremark did have an adequate internal reporting system at the
time of the misconduct. 97 The court recognized a person, in
good faith, striving to meet their responsibilities of corporate
governance, would be bound to take into account the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines’ opportunities to reduce such penalties. 98
An analogous standard could be used for corporations
undergoing civil investigations such that when a company has an
adequate compliance system in place, not only can the innocent
directors evade liability, but an innocent corporation can as well.
The court reasoned that even a rationally designed compliance
structure may nonetheless fail to detect noncompliance with the
law, but such a system will assure this type of information is
brought to the board of directors’ attention in a timely manner
and they may rectify the situation as appropriate. 99
In another case, however, the court made clear that the only
two defenses available in a criminal or civil FCA claim are
negligence and innocent mistake that the claims were false. 100
The government needs to prove that the company “ha[d] actual
knowledge of the information,” “act[ed] in deliberate ignorance,”
or “act[ed] in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 970–71.

Id.
Id. at 970–71.
Id. at 970.
Id.
See United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 929 F.2d

1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that in filing a claim under the FCA statute, the
“knowingly” provision is emphasized repeatedly and requires at minimum
“deliberate ignorance” or “reckless disregard”).
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information.” 101 In instances where the company has an effective
compliance program in place and does not meet the standards of
negligence or innocent mistake, there must be another option to
show that the company took all the necessary steps to prevent
fraud and the misconduct still happened anyway.
A. How this Gap Impacts the Health Care Industry
Compliance programs are especially integral in the health
care industry because instances of fraud and abuse are more
frequent in reimbursement and payment areas. 102 It is also a
complicated industry because coverage and reimbursement of
health care services are driven by inconsistent rules which allow
for many ways to abuse the system. 103 As one article put it, “the
health care industry provides an environment that is ripe for
abuse.” 104 Due to the uncertainty surrounding medical care and
the government programs involved—such as Medicare and
Medicaid, intended to aid vulnerable patients—health care
providers have the opportunity to take advantage and defraud
the federal programs.105 Additionally, health care fraud and
abuse are a high priority for the federal government. Among all
its federal programs, the government accounts for the largest
amount of funding for health care services at 29%. 106
Additionally, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) was
originally created largely due to scandals in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. 107 With the government being so intertwined
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(A)(i)-(iii).
Jane Kim, Staying Responsible Within the Healthcare Industry in the Era of
the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 129, 157
101
102

(2017).

Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 320.
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 320.
105
Morris & Thompson, supra note 1, at 320; see Medicare and Medicaid,
CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11306Medicare-Medicaid.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2021) (noting that Medicare is
intended for people 65 or older, certain people under 65 with disabilities, and
people of any age with End-Stage Renal Disease and that Medicaid is for those with
limited income and resources).
106
National Health Expenditures 2019 Highlights, CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERV., (2019), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/highlights.pdf. (last
visited Sept. 20, 2021).
107 S. REP. 94-1324, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5420, 5422.
103
104
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in health care programs, the government has great incentive to
protect its programs from fraud and abuse.
In the health care industry, the DOJ’s enforcement comes
almost entirely from civil FCA cases. 108 More than 75% of health
care fraud cases are filed as qui tam suits under the FCA. 109 This
is significant because the root of fraud cases is often found within
the company, and this shows that the issues can also be addressed
within a company’s infrastructure. The DOJ reported that, in
2019, it recovered over $3 billion from settlements and
judgments under the civil FCA, and of that, $2.6 billion related
to matters involving the health care industry. 110 Additionally, the
DOJ noted that its health care fraud settlements and judgments
have exceeded $2 billion for the past ten years. 111 Health care is
an industry where the government accounts for a significant
percentage of revenue and, as mentioned above, where such suits
are more likely. 112 A compliance defense is particularly necessary
for health-related fraud because health care compliance incites a
heightened level of complexity and enforcement due to the
complicated legal and regulatory requirements. 113 Therefore, a
strong compliance program that reflects these heightened
standards should be rewarded.
Health care is a heavily regulated industry and is governed
by multiple regulators: (1) federal agencies and laws, such as the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and numerous
fraud and abuse laws; 114 (2) state laws; (3) private payor health
care program requirements; and (4) health care providers’ own
108
109

Elberg, supra note 66.
Janice M. Symchych, Michael K. Fee, Bryan A. Pennington, & Allison S.

Owen, Settlement of Major Healthcare Fraud Enforcement Proceedings: A Probing
and Frank Analysis of the Competing Variables, 25 HEALTH LAW. 1, 3 (2013).
110 Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (updated Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019.
111

Id.

Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud? 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2215 (2010).
113 Kim, supra note 102, at 156.
114
Kim, supra note 102, at 131; see Health Insurance Portability and
112

Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R § 160.103.
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rules and regulations, including their business and ethical
principles.115 Some health-related federal laws not only provide
guidance on compliance programs but actually require certain
organizations to establish policies and procedures. For example,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) allows
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to
require those participating in Medicare and Medicaid to
implement compliance programs. 116
If a company has a robust compliance program in place, it is
more likely the wrongdoing will be discovered before charges are
brought. 117 This is supplemental to the benefits offered under the
qui tam statute for self-disclosure, however, because a compliance
program will never be able to catch every instance of
misconduct. 118 A company would still want an effective program
in place to protect them if misconduct is not caught right away
rather than self-disclosing each time and not addressing the root
issue.
Uncovering the wrongful conduct early allows the
company to mitigate the behavior and may prevent qui tam
claims. 119 This should serve as enough of an incentive for the
DOJ to implement a compliance defense so they can better
enforce compliance, be consistent, and deter fraud, but they
should not go further to allow them to focus on larger fraud and
abuse issues. Also, the greatest incentive for the health care
companies to establish an effective compliance program is
providing this affirmative defense for civil claims to avoid wasting
company and government resources and to forge a better
company. Additionally, other industries have a compliance
incentive in the criminal realm, which is enough to protect
them. 120 But since health care is primarily civil law, the incentive
also needs to be for civil offenses, otherwise, it does not serve its
Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63
Fed.
Reg.,
8987,
8988
(Feb.
23,
1998),
https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf [hereinafter OIG Compliance
Program Guidance]; Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 5, at 1378.
116
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. No. 111-148, § 6001,
124 Stat. 119, 751; Kim, supra note 102, at 158.
117 Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 5, at 1379.
118 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
119 Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 5, at 1379.
120 Huff, supra note 26, at 1270–71.
115
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purpose.
Although there will always be an incentive for
companies to have a compliance program to deter fraud, without
a defense companies will always be responsible for illegal conduct
regardless of their preventative measures.
IV.

THE SOLUTION

The federal government’s current approach of post hoc
enforcement to recovering the costs of fraud is ineffective at
preventing the fraud from the outset. 121 Creating a compliance
program as an affirmative defense to civil FCA charges will make
it more in line with criminal charges, which provide a significant
reduction in penalties for compliance programs, and a defense is
often advocated for when criminal charges are brought. 122
The current damages and penalty structure of the FCA
requires, at the very least, a more definitive measurement of
rewards. A strong reward system encourages compliance to be
taken more seriously and promotes deterrence by increasing the
chance that the offender will be caught, thus increasing the cost
of committing such fraud. 123 In fact, when the FCA statute was
first amended in 1986, Former Assistant Attorney General John
R. Bolton noted the “significant deterrent” power of the FCA,
stating that the use of civil remedies is an essential element to
prevent fraud. 124 Additionally, United States Senator, Chuck
Grassley, the primary sponsor of the 1986 amendments,
expressed that enforcement of the statute is two-fold: 125 (1) it will
allow the government to recuperate fraudulent payments, and;
(2) it will deter those who may attempt to defraud the
government. 126 When the FCA was amended in 2009, United
States Senator Patrick Leahy further emphasized the Act’s
deterrent value and stated, “[t]he only way you are going to stop
[fraud] is to show you are going to stop it.” 127 Therefore,
Compliance-Focused Reforms, supra note 14, at 8.
Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2.
123
Claire Sylvia & Emily Stabile, Rethinking Compliance: The Role of
Whistleblowers, 84 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 451, 462 (2016).
124 H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 63 (1986).
125 Id. at 18.
126 Id.; Sylvia & Stabile, supra note 123, at 462–63.
127 155 CONG. REC. S4410 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
121
122
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establishing an affirmative compliance defense can be
accomplished by legislation, but also could be initiated by DOJ’s
discretionary authority to enact a policy not to pursue charges for
companies that actively try to deter fraud and meet a compliance
defense standard. 128
A. Factors of a Compliance Defense
A compliance defense to civil charges can be modeled after
the suggestions for a defense to criminal charges because they
will accomplish the same goal of effectively deterring fraud and
promoting companies’ compliance efforts.
To go further,
however, a compliance defense for civil charges must be intricate
enough to remedy health care-related fraud. 129 Health care is a
very high-risk industry and thus requires reasonably designed
programs that include a robust monitoring and reporting
system. 130 There are various sources that entities can go to for
guidance.
The OIG outlines key compliance program factors
specifically for health care providers such as (1) written policies
and procedures; (2) the designation of a chief compliance officer;
(3) training programs; (4) hotline to receive complaints; (5)
appropriate disciplinary action; (6) auditing and monitoring; and
(7) investigation and remediation.131 There are suggestions that
although these guidelines are voluntary, the word “guidance”
implies the weight of the law and that compliance programs are
evidence of adhering to such law. 132
Given the above guidance from the OIG, a strong regulatory
compliance program will consider what actions the company
128 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 333. Professor Jacob Elberg has also
proposed that the DOJ give credit in the form of a reduced multiplier when settling
an FCA matter with an organization determined to have had an effective
compliance program in place at the time of the offense. Elberg, supra note 66.
129 See supra Part III.
130
OIG Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 115 (noting that
compliance programs are “especially critical” in the reimbursement and payment
areas, where claims and billings are often the source of fraud and abuse and that it
is “incumbent” upon the health industry and, especially, corporate officers to assure
adequate systems are in place).
131 OIG Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 115, at 8989.
132 Kim, supra note 102, at 157.
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takes before and after the violation occurred, including selfreporting, cooperating fully with law enforcement, and taking
remedial steps to prevent the recurrence of the act. 133 It is
necessary for health care providers and corporate officers to
implement effective programs to promote ethical conduct. 134 An
effective compliance program accomplishes various important
checks for a health care entity. It sets the groundwork for
conforming to federal and state laws; it promotes a culture within
the business to prevent, detect, and resolve noncompliance; and
it fosters adherence to the company’s business and ethical
principles.135 The sheer existence of a compliance program will
not be enough to negate liability, but protection will be afforded
if, proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the company has
a functioning program relating to the violation at hand. 136
While the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to civil cases,
scholars use them as a measure in promoting a compliance
defense. Based on the Sentencing Guidelines, scholars suggest
that an effective program should have the following elements:
“(1) an administrator to oversee its implementation and
enforcement; (2) a written set of policies distributed to employees
at all levels; (3) a violation reporting process; and (4) a process
for disciplining employees who violate company policies.” 137 The
Sentencing Guidelines direct a company to select a program
administrator who is of significant authority. 138 This individual
should have “substantial control over the organization or who
have a substantial role in the making of policy within the
organization.” 139
A committee to oversee the compliance
program often considers multiple viewpoints on the subject
matter to create a balance among the company and allows the
person who exercises the administrator function to be widely
available to employees.140 Scholars also suggest the administrator
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 333.
OIG Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 115 (noting that corporate
officers and managers should provide “ethical leadership” to the company).
135 Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 5, at 1378.
136 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 684.
137 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 388.
138 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 388.
139 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 388.
140 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 389.
133
134
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should have the authority to implement and disseminate the
policies and procedures through training, monitoring, and
disciplining; responding appropriately to violations; and
updating and revising the program.141 The written policies
should include the company’s general code of conduct that
applies to all employees and the supplemental policies and
procedures that address certain areas of concern and apply only
to affected employees. 142 The process for reporting violations
should be accessible to employees at all levels without fear of
retaliation. 143 The company must provide a system for employees
to comfortably report violations because the validity of the
compliance program will hinge on its ability to discover any
wrongdoing within the organization. 144 Finally, the organization
must have a process to impose sanctions on violators. 145 An
organization should have disciplinary guidelines with great
flexibility, while still achieving a “deterrent and punitive effect.” 146
Scholars outlined additional elements to an effective
compliance program, including timing, subject matter of the
program, degree of formality, industry practice, and due
diligence. 147 The timing of implementing a compliance program
matters, and the program must be established before the
offense. 148 This is because the DOJ does not want to see
companies wait to invest in their programs to prevent
wrongdoing after the offense was committed. 149
The issues each compliance program will address widely
depend on the type of company. 150 An effective compliance
program should cover conduct likely to be considered
wrongdoing and anticipate any potential problems. 151 The health
Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 389.
Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 389-90.
143 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 392.
144 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 392.
145 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 393.
146 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 393.
147 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 380-82 (citing U.S.S.G. Guidelines Manual
§ 8C2.5(f)).
148 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 380.
149 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 380.
150 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 380.
151 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 380.
141
142
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care industry involves the types of companies where compliance
is especially complex, and their programs require another level
of intricacy. 152 The degree of formality of each compliance
program will also depend on the size of the company, and larger
organizations should typically have more formal programs. 153
The effectiveness of a compliance program will likely be
compared to programs of other companies in the same
industry. 154 Additionally, an adequate compliance program will
show that the company exercised due diligence when attempting
to detect or prevent any misconduct or wrongdoing. 155
Companies need a high incentive to implement a compliance
program that is robust and effective in preventing and detecting
fraud because they must adhere to various state, federal, and
regulatory laws. Many programs suffer from a lack of funds and
resources necessary for an effective compliance program.156
Under the current structure, the only benefit afforded to a
company is the DOJ’s consideration of corrective actions taken in
response to civil charges under the FCA. 157 The discrepancies in
rewards from the government discourage companies from
creating a dynamic compliance program that invests in training,
auditing, and monitoring of policies and procedures.158 While
companies may be encouraged to have compliance programs to
reduce fraud in general, without an established compliance
defense, their programs will not adequately protect them.
Greater incentives would encourage better detection,
152 See generally Kim, supra note 102; see also supra Part III on How the Gap
Impacts the Health Care Industry.
153 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 381.
154 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 381.
155 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 381–82.
156 See generally Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—
and How to Fix Them, 96 HARV. BUS. REV. 116 (2018).

Department of Justice Issues Guidance on False Claims Act Matters and
Updates
Justice
Manual,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUST.
(May
2019),
157

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-issues-guidance-false-claims-actmatters-and-updates-justice-manual (stating that “remedial measures may include
undertaking a thorough analysis of the root cause of the misconduct, appropriately
disciplining or replacing those responsible for the misconduct, accepting
responsibility for the violation and implementing or improving compliance
programs”); see also Guidelines for Cooperation and Remediation in FCA Matters,
supra note 70.
158 Narine, supra note 43, at 46.
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documentation, and investigation of activities that companies
may otherwise choose to ignore. 159 Comparatively, the United
States’ approach to corporate liability, and specifically in the
criminal context, differs from other countries.160 One article cites
Representative Bobby Scott, a member of Congress, arguing that
with global businesses being so interconnected today, the United
States should not be disadvantaged by “over-aggressive”
corporate penalties. 161 This could also be applicable to civil FCA
claims because corporations should not be subject to harsher
treatment when facing claims under the FCA. In the criminal
context, a fine imposed on an organization will be reduced if the
compliance program was implemented prior to the violation. 162
But, the influence of an effective compliance program is not
limited to criminal law; it also helps fight civil lawsuits. 163 The
notes to the amendment of Chapter Eight of the Sentencing
Guidelines provide that the section is influenced by the federal
criminal law, but an effective compliance program will also
facilitate compliance with all applicable laws. 164
Proponents of an affirmative compliance defense to criminal
charges argue that the factors considered to prevail are just as
applicable to civil charges. 165 The company must prove it
established a compliance program designed to deter, detect,
punish, and disclose illegal behavior. 166 The organization must
also present evidence of the program in action during the
particular issue at hand, such as whether the employee was
trained, their reward system, and auditing and monitoring
procedures. 167 The DOJ, as well as judges, will be able to assess
an effective compliance program based on the standards set by

159
160
161

Narine, supra note 43, at 46.
Narine, supra note 43, at 81.
Narine, supra note 43, at 81 (citing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing

Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary. 112th Cong. 19-45 (2011)).
162 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f)(1).
163 Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2, at 24.
164
Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2, at 24 (citing U.S.S.G. Manual app. C,

Amendment 673).
165 Narine, supra note 43, at 81.
166 Narine, supra note 43, at 81.
167 Narine, supra note 43, at 81.
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the Sentencing Guidelines and be able to identify any deceiving
or artificial programs. 168 The program must show its effectiveness
and that it prevents some misconduct. 169 The programs can also
be assessed based on their reasonableness when compared to
other similar companies. 170
Another aspect of the defense is the burden on the
government, and ideally, if a prosecutor cannot show an
organization’s compliance program was ineffective in detecting
and preventing fraud, they should not pursue the matter
further. 171 Existing caselaw illustrates that the existence of an
effective compliance program will be a factor in determining civil
liability for an organization and the potential consequences. 172
The court in United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco
Managed Care, provides that a corporation’s ineffective
compliance program could establish the “knowingly” factor of a
false claim. 173 In the case, two pharmacists filed a qui tam suit
against Medco Health Solutions alleging violations of the FCA. 174
The government argued that Medco failed to have an effective
compliance program in place to detect and prevent false claims
and thus knowingly submitted false claims. 175 The court agreed
that such evidence of non-existent or insufficient compliance
programs satisfies the requirements under the FCA. 176 The case
was settled before trial, so the question of ultimate consequences
for failure to implement an effective compliance program is left
open; 177 nonetheless, it follows that when there is significant civil
exposure for lack of an effective program, there should be an
affirmative defense for the successful implementation of an
effective program.
Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA. ST.
UNIV. L. REV. 763, 769 (2005).
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Narine, supra note 43, at 47–48.
Narine, supra note 43, at 86.
172 See United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336
F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
173 Id. at 441.
174 Id. at 434.
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Id.; Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2, at 26.
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The main argument that an organization should espouse in
using their compliance program as a defense is that the entity is a
“good corporate citizen,” and the misconduct was the result of a
rogue employee. 178 Also, an incentive for a concrete compliance
defense will foster an environment that discourages
wrongdoing. 179 Although wrongdoing can still occur despite an
effective compliance program, a company will be able to address
the issue swiftly and minimize any risks or consequences. 180
Establishing a formal compliance defense will initiate a shift in
companies’ deterrence mechanisms from fear to social
responsibility. 181 To accomplish this, some scholars suggest that a
compliance defense requires not only a law enforcement
approach, but also a community-based approach. 182 The idea is
to change current employee perceptions of compliance
programs—that they are not in their best interest—to reflect that
compliance programs are a valuable and necessary component of
companies. 183 The DOJ will want to signal to the health care
community that they have made fighting fraud and corruption
priorities and that compliance is for the common good. 184
B. Benefits of Implementing a Compliance Program
Implementing and maintaining compliance programs are
expensive and time-consuming tasks. 185 A company may weigh
Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 376.
Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 376.
180 Webb & Molo, supra note 41, at 376.
181 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 337.
182 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 337.
183
See David Hess, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Through Corporate Social Responsibility, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1121,
1137 (2012)
A compliance program implemented solely to meet external,
regulatory demands can lose legitimacy with employees within
the corporation who grow to see the program as not 'valued,
necessary, or useful' and not in their best interests. Not only does
the program lose legitimacy, but so do the ethical values the
program is designed to further.
184
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 337; Elberg, supra note 66 (“DOJ’s
failure to separate good from bad corporate actors is a failure not only from both a
deterrence and a retributive perspective, but in undermining perceptions of
fairness and legitimacy”).
185 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 679.
178
179
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the significant costs against the inability of a compliance program
to yield a significant benefit. 186 Under the current framework, a
company may refuse to implement a compliance program, but as
discussed below, with an affirmative defense in place, the
company would not be penalized for self-policing, but instead
rewarded for it. 187 A compliance program will allow management
to have a better view of employees’ behaviors, decrease exposure
to legal action, improve morale among employees, and improve
communication.188
The defense can also encourage good
corporate citizenship and long-term cost-effectiveness. 189
Employee liability of misconduct can serve to improve corporate
conduct within the company, and creating a compliance defense
will further this goal of internal monitoring. 190 An effective
compliance program can also present a positive public image and
show that the company is taking the steps necessary to mitigate
the misconduct. 191 In turn, this creates a reputation that is useful
for the company and its business. 192 Overall, companies may not
invest in a compliance program because of its huge expense
unless there is a huge reward. By implementing these changes,
companies will realize the investment is worth it.
A compliance program serves as a signal to the company’s
employees of the company’s clear intention to abide by the law. 193
Not only does a strong program provide employees with clear
expectations that may prevent them from unintentionally
deviating from the law or guidelines, but it will also discourage an
employee from intentionally engaging in misconduct because
they are aware that the company will disapprove and discipline
them. 194 While many hold compliance defense arguments as
pertinent in criminal charges, they are just as applicable to civil
charges and will greatly assist the health care industry in proving
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Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 679.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
Ehler-Lejcher, supra note 5, at 1381–82.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680–81.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 680.
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compliance when parties bring claims under the FCA. 195
Structuring an effective compliance program helps health care
providers achieve their premiere goal of providing quality care to
patients and customers. 196 Ultimately, a compliance program will
become cost-effective for the corporation and law enforcement by
saving money and resources. 197
Although a compliance program will cost time and money in
legal fees and employee productivity time, a compliance defense
as an incentive will make the costs worthwhile. 198 Handling
misconduct without a compliance program will cost far more in
financial penalties, litigation, employee productivity time, and
efforts to remedy their reputation than if a program was
established in the first place. 199 Additionally, the benefits are twofold because the company will not have to expend additional
time or money, and the government will not have to prosecute
further, thus saving their money and resources.200 If an employee
does commit a fraudulent act, a compliance program can detect
the misconduct that otherwise may have slid under the radar of
management and law enforcement. 201 Even if companies do not
reveal the misconduct right away, compliance programs are still
important because companies will want to address the root cause
of the issue to prevent it from happening again, rather than
receiving a reward for self-disclosing the wrongdoing, but not
mitigating the principal cause further. Adding an affirmative
compliance defense into the current standard of liability aligns
with the goals of the law that attempt to “measure, encourage,
and reward” lawful behavior. 202 An affirmative defense would also
serve the public in making the standards fair and more
predictable while limiting prosecutorial discretion. 203
195
Narine, supra note 43, at 81; Kim, supra note 102, at 157 (“Compliance
programs are ‘evidence’ of complying with the law.”).
196 OIG Compliance Program Guidance, supra note 115, at 8987–88.
197 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 681.
198 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 681–82.
199 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 681–82.
200 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 684.
201 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 679.
202
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1442 (2009).
203 Id. at 1445–46.
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C. Opposition
Opponents to an affirmative compliance defense posit that it
would be a futile effort because companies will not want to
finance litigation until the end or will push to settle in fear of
losing at trial. 204 To resolve those issues, some scholars suggest
that companies could seek a declaratory judgment or pretrial
motion after charges have been filed to establish their ability to
utilize the defense at the outset and will not be required to
endure costly litigation if it is not necessary.205 Another approach
is to raise the defense at the earliest stages of negotiations with
the government so they would not prosecute any further nor
attach any penalties or fines.206
One scholar argues that with a compliance defense at a
company’s disposal, they may elect to establish the bare
minimum of a compliance program, labeled as “windowdressing,” which will not be truly effective, yet they will still be
able to take advantage of the defense.207 Although “windowdressing” is of concern with this type of defense, the standard for
evoking the defense will be a high bar to meet. A company will
have to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that it has
implemented a practical, functioning program relating to the . . .
violation.” 208 Top management will have to testify that their
company implemented the program correctly and they
reasonably believed they were meeting all standards to prevent
the misconduct. 209 Companies should also have to show evidence
of training, anything that could have led to the wrongdoing, and
the auditing and monitoring systems. 210 Others have suggested
preventing companies from persuading a court or agency of the
strength of their compliance program but not investing
additional resources to prevent wrongdoing, a third-party or
government entity should audit the program before raising the
See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 333–34.
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 333.
206 Narine, supra note 43, at 47.
207
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the PrincipalAgent Model, 32 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 571, 572, 574 (2005).
208 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 28, at 684.
209 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 332.
210 Narine, supra note 43, at 47.
204
205
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defense.211
Additionally, some scholars argue that judges or juries are
not equipped to assess a compliance program and its
effectiveness on corporate misconduct. 212 One response to this
opposition is that even if courts cannot identify the most
favorable compliance program, they can determine those that are
helpless.213 Also, the company’s goal is to invoke the compliance
defense to prove to prosecutors early on that they had the proper
measures in place, thus ideally avoiding court. 214 This would
allow the DOJ and experts who are more equipped with the
proper knowledge to determine its effectiveness.
Another counterpoint to those who think companies will
invoke the defense without a truly effective program is that legal
liability is not the only harm a company may face for corporate
wrongdoing. 215 The publicity effects may harm the company far
worse than legal penalties, providing another incentive to adhere
to an effective compliance regime, to show the public that they
comply with the law. 216 Furthermore, there is a whole arsenal of
benefits to implementing a compliance program beyond its use
in a legal proceeding. 217
Some of these benefits include
“increasing the social welfare” of the company, such that it deters
any wrongdoing and presents to the public the image of
compliance, and in turn, creates a perception to the employees
that the program works. 218 A robust compliance defense would
encourage companies to monitor their business and employees
internally, timely mitigate risks, and cooperate with law
enforcement after a violation is discovered; it ultimately would
enable a company to make a deliberate decision to invest in its
compliance program.219

Narine, supra note 43, at 47.
Krawiec, supra note 207, at 580–81.
213 Aviram, supra note 168, at 769.
214 Narine, supra note 43, at 81–82.
215 Aviram, supra note 168, at 765.
216 Aviram, supra note 168, at 765.
217
Aviram, supra note 168, at 765; see supra Part IV on Benefits of
Implementing a Compliance Program.
218 Aviram, supra note 168, at 768, 774.
219 Narine, supra note 43, at 49–50.
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CONCLUSION

The DOJ should implement a policy allowing for an
affirmative defense of a company’s compliance program as
evidence of innocence in civil cases. Amending the statute could
also accomplish this goal; however, the DOJ can also use its
authority to create a new policy without needing to go through
legislation. A consistent base across criminal and civil actions
with a compliance defense is necessary to decrease the
uncertainty regarding the prosecutor’s discretion and create a
more predictable objective process. While a compliance defense
is widely structured and argued for in criminal cases, this
approach has been left out of cases involving civil violations
under the FCA. 220
This type of discrepancy greatly impacts the health care
industry because most of the fraud violations brought under the
FCA are health-related frauds. 221 With excess claims filed within
the health care industry, companies need a valuably larger
incentive to create an effective compliance program and an
incentive for the DOJ to protect the federal programs. 222 This
kind of change will better allow health care providers to partner
with the government in fighting fraud and create consistency
among FCA charges.
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Raspanti & Mackuse, supra note 2, at 22.
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